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referred to as Payment by Results (PbR). The PbR reimbursements are nationally agreed 1 tariffs, set by the Department of Health and used in England by purchasers of health care to 2 reimburse individual providers -mainly hospitals -for the provision of treatment. The tying of 3 interventions to specific levels of reimbursement provides a means of testing the importance 4 of financial consideration in a managed care environment, particularly if clinical guidance 5 exists within that specific disease area. 6 7
Of particular interest is the case of Hip Replacement, an extremely common procedure with 8 substitutable treatment options available and where, at least in other systems, patient 9
preferences and financial incentives have been shown to play a role in treatment up-take 10 (Doiron, Fiebig and Suziedelyte, 2014). Hip Replacement presents a unique opportunity to 11 study the incentives created by English PbR payment system. In a Hip Replacement, two 12 main types of prostheses are available; cemented and uncemented. Both types have been 13 around since the 1970s and clinical evidence suggests that both prostheses have comparable 14 rates of success (Abdulkarim et al, 2013) . Until recently, the vast majority of Hip 15
Replacements performed in the UK used cemented prostheses, although the number of 16
uncemented Hip Replacements undertaken has increased substantially in the past decade. 17
This change in prosthesis use has coincided with the introduction of separate reimbursement 18 rates for the two types of prostheses, which provide a more generous surplus for the 19 uncemented implant, possibly to cover the longer operating times required to fit the 20 uncemented device. The increase in up-take of the more generously reimbursed implant is in 21 spite of recommendations from the NICE that favour the use of cemented prostheses in Hip 22
Replacements (NICE, 2000; updated in 2013) . While NICE guidance and quality standards 23 are not absolutely mandatory, they are used by NHS regulators to establish acceptable levels 24 of care, and if required health care providers must defend any individual treatment decisions 25 which run contrary to NICE guidance. 26 27
Hip replacements are also of interest because individual hospital providers control the 28 procurement practices with respect to prostheses; thus managers have potentially more 29 influence over the type of procedure finally implemented than in other cases. In their 30 analysis of procurement practices in the NHS, Davies and Lorgelly (2013), focused on a case-31 study of Hip Replacement and the purchasing of hip prosthesis. They note that in the UK 32 NHS, the hospital through its centralised procurement policiesas opposed to the individual 33 surgeondetermines the specific prostheses to purchase and negotiates quantities and prices 34 with the suppliers. Individual surgeons feed their preferences into the procurement process; 35 acting as an agent for their patients by including patient characteristics within their own 36 surgical preferences. The particular prostheses purchased at the hospital level thus reflect 37 individual surgeon preferences, historical procurement practices, prices and reimbursement 38 levels. Davies and Lorgelly (2013) , also note that, if volume discounts are available this may 39 lead to specialisation in prosthesis type. In other words, characteristics of hospital behaviour, 40
as informed by surgical assessment, will determine the specific prosthesis to be purchased by 41 any hospital, at any point in time. There will inevitably be a trade-off, at the hospital level, 42 between management and surgical preferences. However, it is the ability to centralise 43 procurement decisions and to hold stock that provides a mechanism through which hospitals 44
can control the type of device, and therefore the revenue generated from this relatively 45 common procedure. 46 47
With regards to Hip Replacement prosthesis, we have then a situation in the UK NHS, where 48
England has different fixed DRG-type reimbursement rates (PbR) for two common, 49 substitutable procedures -cemented and uncemented replacementswhile at the same time, 50 in England NICE recommends the less expensive cemented replacements above uncemented 1 replacements in their clinical guidance. In Scotland, as providers are not reimbursed for 2 cases treated, no such financial incentive exists to influence choice. This situation provides a 3 means of analysing, in a controlled manner, the impact financial incentives can have on 4 specific procedure up-take at the individual hospital level, for a procedure where prosthesis 5 type does not affect clinical outcome. This provides a unique case-study of individual 6 hospital purchasing decisions, made through managed procurement practices, where 7 decisions may be influenced by revenue generation given that prosthesis type has no 8 influence on patient outcomes. 9 10
The 1999 devolution has presented a natural experiment in health care provision within an 11
NHS system as England and Scotland have diverged substantially in the reforms they have 12
implemented to meet their National Health Service objectives -essentially creating two 13 different NHS systems within the UK (Leys, 1999; Pollock, 1999) . The English NHS has 14 embraced market mechanisms and cooperation with the private sector, while the Scottish 15 NHS has moved in the opposite direction, and created a highly centralised system that 16 maintains trust in its providers to allocate resources effectively, and strives for improvement 17 through integration (Steele and Cylus, 2014; Greer, 2006) . 18 19
One of the main differences in health policy that has emerged in the years following 20 devolution has been in the funding of inpatient hospital care. Prior to 1997, England and 21
Scotland funded inpatient care in broadly the same way: health care purchasers and providers 22 negotiated the services that would be provided through bulk contracts (Ham, 2004) . Scotland 23 has moved away from this funding system and since 2004 has funded inpatient care through 24 the allocation of global hospital budgets (Scottish Parliament, 2004) . England on the other 25 hand has further supported the internal market by moving away from the bulk contract system 26 of funding hospital episodes to a fix-priced activity-based payment system, of DRG-type 27 reimbursement, known as Payment by Results (PbR), introduced in in 2003/04. 28 29 Given the divergence in funding for inpatient activity across the two nations, we use Scottish 30 NHS hospitals as a control group within a difference-in-difference style estimator, as well as 31 employing a large number of robustness checks, to test whether the up-take of the more 32 expensive uncemented prosthesis in England was influenced by reimbursement levels, at a 33 time when the less expensive cemented prosthesis was being recommended by NICE. Our 34 results add to the literature on the impact of financial incentives on individual providers in a 35 managed care setting by providing a specific example. Our conclusions suggest that English 36 NHS hospitals did indeed have higher up-take rates of the more generously reimbursed 37
uncemented Hip Replacements than the (Scottish) control group providers after PbR had been 38 introduced in England, despite the English clinical guidance recommending cemented Hip 39
Replacements. The ability to hold stock and for hospitals to manage procurement when 40 acquiring prostheses allows individual in-patient providers of Hip Replacement flexibility in 41 their purchasing decision. 42 43 The precise question we examine in this paper is: To what extent any observed change in the 44 selection of Hip Replacement prosthesis type in England, can be related to the financial 45 incentive introduced by the differential reimbursement of treatment interventions by 46 DRG/PbR payment? As we document below, in the case of Hip Replacement, the financial 47 incentive associated with PbR reimbursement provided a signal opposite to that outlined by 48 the NICE technology appraisal. As such, the examination of this question provides a unique 49 study of the impact that financial incentives have on clinical practice in an environment 1 which is highly regulated, but where individual hospitals have discretion over procurement. 2 3
The paper proceeds by briefly outlining the funding differences that exist in England and 4
Scotland, as well as highlighting the pattern of prosthesis up-take in both countries over a 10-5
year period, which motivates the use of Scottish providers as a control. The following 6 sections outline the data and methods, after which we present results and offer conclusions. 7 8 9 2. Background 10 11
This study is concerned with the impact that the different incentives introduced for the 12 provision of care across England and Scotland had on the uptake of competing procedures; 13 cemented and uncemented Hip Replacement. Given the timeframe we are particularly 14 interested in examining the role financial incentives can play in influencing clinical practice. 15
As Over the past decade different types of incentives have been introduced that favour one 24 implant over the other, as demonstrated for the two countries in Figure 1 . 25 26 < Insert Figure 1 here > 27 28
Immediately after Devolution, in 2000 NICE, which is based in England, conducted a 29 technology appraisal (TA2) that recommended that cemented Hip Replacements should be 30 performed over cementless procedures (NICE, 2000) , this was updated in 2013 and the same 31 guidance was reconfirmed. This guidance is based on the difference in cost between the two 32 prostheses (cemented being cheaper on average) as there was little long term (10 years or 33 more) evidence to suggest which implants had better outcomes (in particular, revision rates Replacement, coded as HGR H02, was one of the first 33 HRG groups to be allocated a 45 reimbursement level in the phasing out of the PbR policy. After one year, this HRG group 46 5 While HRGs were initially introduced in the late 1990s as an exercise to help define hospital activity costs based on clinically meaningful clinical groupings (Street and Dawson, 2002) , it is only under PbR that they became attached to reimbursement.
(H02) was split into two separate HRGs (H80 and H81), representing cemented and 1 uncemented primary Hip Replacement respectively, thus moving towards a differential 2 reimbursement for each of the two procedures from 2005 onwards. This differential 3 reimbursement continued until a new grouper was introduced in 2009, and the categorization 4 of HRGs stopped reflecting the type on implant and instead reflected the severity of the 5 patient. Hip Replacement reimbursement has further changed since the introduction of Best 6
Practice Tariffs for Hip Fracture in 2010, and these do not differentiate between cemented 7 and uncemented prostheses either 6 . 8 9
The price of the national HRG tariff, updated yearly, is determined by the average of the 10 costs calculated by all hospitals for each of their HRGs which includes labour, equipment and 11 hospital costs, with small cost adjustments for geographical variation, labour market 12 conditions and excessive length of stay for appropriate reason. There is a three-year delay 7 13 between hospitals submitting cost data and these data being converted into prices, and so an 14 inflationary adjustment is also made to each HRG (Mason et al, 2011) . HRG classifications 15 themselves are updated and refined, through the continual updating of 'groupers'; the last of 16 these updates took place in 2009 when HRG 4.0 was phased in. 17 18 Table 1 shows the tariff for the different HRG groupings over this period, alongside the 19 corresponding average costs. In all years after the separation of HRG H02 into two distinct 20
HRGs, the tariff for the elective cemented procedure (H80) has been reimbursed at a higher 21 rate than the elective uncemented procedures, while the tariff for the non-elective procedures 22
reimburses the uncemented procedure (H81) more highly. Although one might expect this 23 difference to be linked to the underlying costs of these procedures, this does not appear to be 24 the case, as illustrated by the national reference costs. These costs show the uncemented 25 procedure to be cheaper in both settings 8 . In addition, the difference in the underlying cost 26 and the tariff price is always larger for the uncemented procedures 9 . This suggests that greater 27 financial surplus is made through performing the uncemented procedure rather than the 28 cemented, particularly for emergency procedures. 29 30 < Insert Table 1 here >  31  32 An estimate of the average revenue gain, , to be made from switching to uncemented 33 replacement from cemented replacement, for each admission type j, for a given year t, is 34 presented in the final columns of Table 1 ; calculated as:
As Hip Replacement was one of the first 33 conditions introduced, it was phased out to all providers in 2004.
Thus, all types of English hospitals (Acute Care Trusts, Foundation Trusts) received the same reimbursement. This is also true for the introduction of the differential tariff the next year. The only exception to this are the ISTC providers who were given a tariff uplift to presumably cover capital costs, however the information on the public uplift was not made publicly available. 7 Since the introduction of the new HRG grouper in 2009 this has now been reduced to a two-year delay. 8 While the uncemented prostheses are on average more expensive than the cemented ones, the surgery is faster to perform (approximately 15 min according to Yates et al (2006) ) which may account for the lower average cost. 9 Reference costs are not adjusted for age or other patient characteristics. In their conversion to the tariff they undergo data filtering, cleaning, spell conversation, adjustments to reflect tariff scope and structure and price adjustments. Also note that these reference costs will not include any discounts to purchasers.
1 where ̅̅̅̅ and ̅̅̅̅̅ represent the tariff for uncemented and cemented Hip Replacement by 2 admission type, and ̅̅̅̅ and ̅̅̅̅̅ represent the average cost for the cemented and 3
uncemented HRGs. As there was a three-year delay between hospitals submitting cost data 4 and these data being converted into prices, the t-3 subscript is attached to the average costs. 5 6
These estimates indicate that in the case of non-elective Hip Replacement large revenue 7
gains, approximately £900-£1700 per case, on average, can be made by switching to the 8 uncemented implant over the period in question. The potential revenue gains are smaller in 9 the case of the elective surgery, but are for the most part positive, ranging from an 10 approximate loss of £8 in one specific year, to a gain of about £400 per case on average. The 11
actual prosthesis prices are bound to influence individual hospital procurement practices 12
where, as noted above hospital management and clinicians make explicit purchasing 13 decisions on the type of prosthesis to stock. The national reference costs are used here, as the 14 commercial prices of prostheses are not publicly available, to indicate potential financial 15 surplus and are generally regarded as indicative of true treatment costs. These reference costs 16
are publicly available as averages over all hospitals. The more efficient hospitals have the 17 potential to make larger financial gains than those indicate above. Moreover, these estimates 18 of potential gain do not factor in any implant discounts that can be made through negotiations 19 between individual providers and suppliers. 20 21
In Scotland no differential financial incentives exist, and the technology assessments issued 22
by NICE also do not automatically apply, as clinical guidance is provided by the Scottish 23
Medicines Agency. The NICE guidance relating to Hip Replacement was in fact applied 24 latterly in Scotland, (although not until 2014), where it was introduced by Healthcare 25 Improvement Scotland (HIS). Scotland does however use HRGs to code activity, extending 26 their use from their pre-devolution implementation. From 2005 onwards Scotland also started 27
to calculate an HRG Tariff, which was to be used as a costing tool to promote efficiency. The 28 derivation of the Scottish National tariff is based on the English National Tariff, although 29 differences do exist. While HRGs and the Scottish National Tariff are used to inform service 30 delivery, they are not used for reimbursement. Scotland therefore provides a useful control 31 case to observe the choice of Hip Replacement in a part of the UK NHS were the financial 32 incentives do not apply. However, as the magnitude of activity in much larger in England, it is perhaps more 48 informative to also examine the proportions of Hip Replacement activity over the same 49 period. Figure 3 illustrates the proportion of uncemented cases to the total (uncemented + 50 cemented) over the time period being investigated. Up until 2003, the fraction of uncemented 1
Hip Replacements performed in the two countries remains relatively stable; at about 10% in 2
England and under 5% in Scotland. In England, and with the introduction of PbR in 2003, the 3 proportion of uncemented procedures starts to rapidly increase, until it reaches is peak in 4 2010, making up 50% of the total. In both countries the increase in uncemented proportions 5 coincides with the wider use of HRGs. In England 2003 is the introduction of PbR, while in 6
Scotland 2005 marks the introduction of the use of HRGs as a costing/efficiency tool. 7 8
As Table 1 shows the national reference costs for uncemented Hip Replacement are lower for 9
both Elective and Non-Elective procedures, thus providing hospitals in either country -10 operating under a budget or a fixed price reimbursementto opt for the uncemented Hip 11
Replacement if pursing efficiency gains by some financially astute providers. The financial 12 incentive, introduced by split payments, which reimburse the cheaper Uncemented prosthesis 13 at a higher rate, only magnify this incentive in England. In Scotland, uncemented procedures 14 also increase but not until 2005, when the National Scottish Tariff was introduced for 15 managerial -not reimbursement -reasons, and even then the rate of increase is less rapid than 16
in England and, as shown in Figure 2 , is associated with much smaller changes in levels of 17 activity. 18 19 < Insert Figure 4 here > 20 21
Given that the choice of Hip Replacement procedure is likely to be closely tied with the 22 procurement practices of prostheses we are also interested in examining the proportion of 23 cemented and uncemented Hip Replacements undertaken in each hospital, to understand if 24 the switch to uncemented is driven by particular hospitals switching all their prosthesis or by 25 a selection of the uncemented procedure for particular types of patients across hospitals. 26 Figure 4 illustrates the frequency of uncemented Hip Replacement cases to total (uncemented 27 + cemented) by provider across England and Scotland for selected years. The first panel 28
shows the frequencies in 1996, the first year in our data. In this panel, the histogram 29
illustrates that most providers, in both countries, are not performing any uncemented Hip 30
Replacements, and those who are, are for the most part performing it in less than 25% of their 31 cases. The second panel, shows the situation in 2005, a couple years after PbR has been 32 rolled in. While the situation in Scotland is largely unchanged, in England more providers are 33 performing some uncemented procedures, with a few providers providing almost entirely 34 uncemented procedures. In 2009, the last year of the differential incentive in England, we see 35 that the situation in England is split such that about 50% of providers are performing 36
uncemented procedures on more than half the of their patients. In Scotland more providers 37 have started to provide uncemented Hip Replacementsa few providing almost exclusively 38
uncemented procedures -but the majority continue to provide mostly or exclusively 39
cemented Hip Replacements. Finally, in 2012the last year of our data, England remains 40 split, such that about half the providers are providing mostly uncemented procedures, and 41 half mostly cemented, while in Scotland more providers are providing uncemented 42 procedures but cemented still dominates. 43 44
It is important to note that as activity changes over time as shown by these Figures, with more 45 providers procuring more uncemented prostheses, any financial incentive does not give rise 46
to complete substitution. This no doubt partly reflects existing clinical practices and 47 preferences, as well as the suitability of prosthesis type for individual patients. Any potential 48 financial incentive is therefore mediated by clinical practice. There is switching on average 49 across all providers, indicating a common incentive, but the switching is not complete. 50
The data used to conduct this analysis are drawn from two administrative databases; the 4
English Hospital Episode Statistics (HES) and the Information Services Division (ISD) of 5 NHS Scotland. Both data sets contain records for all NHS patients admitted to all NHS 6 hospitals in each country, with information on all medical and surgical specialties performed. 7
The data also provide information on patient characteristic data (e.g. age), clinical 8
information (e.g. diagnoses using ICD-10 codes, procedures using OPCS codes and HRG 9 codes), mode of admission and details where the patient was treated. The HRG codes used in 10 the ISD data are calculated based on the methodology used in England. 11 12
All individual cases coded with HRG 3.5 grouper codes, H80 and H81 or OPCS codes W371 13 or W381 for Hip Replacement were extracted for the years 1996-2010, as after this date the 14 same (Best Practice Tariffs) were applied to all Hip Replacement procedures in England. 15
Where a different HRG grouper was used, the HRG 3.5 grouper was applied to the data to 16 allow comparisons across the time period. The change in groupers over the time periods 17 makes it difficult to use them over the period being investigated, and so we prefer the surgical 18
OPCS 4 codes to identify uncemented (code W381) and cemented (code W371) procedures 19
which ensure better consistency. The number of cases for each of the HRG groups and OPCS 20 categories were aggregated for each hospital, separately for each year of the sample, and 21 exported into a newly constructed panel, together with aggregated statistics on the patients 22 treated in each hospital, and hospital status information. Table 2 presents descriptive statistics  23 on variables of interest. 24 25 < Insert Table 2 here >  26  27 We use the proportion of uncemented Hip Replacement to total (cemented + uncemented) 28
procedures as the dependent variable in most of our specifications. The proportions variable 29 allows us to capture relative change across the two Hip Replacement techniques, thus directly 30 incorporating any potential substitution from cemented to uncemented Hip Replacements 31 over the time period. It provides, we believe, a stronger test of change is activity than any 32 observed change in levels. 33 34
The aggregated statistics used as controls for severity and patient characteristics are 35 constructed as the mean values for each hospital, for the cases being investigated, derived 36 from individual patient level data. These include age, sex and severity, measured by the 37
Charlson co-morbidity index. The Charlson co-morbidity index controls for a total of 22 38 conditions 10 , and is constructed by assigning a score to each co-morbid condition depending 39 on the one-year risk of death associated with it, and summing these scores up (Charlson et al., 40 1987). Finally, we also construct a measure of volume for each hospital, which simply 41 measures the total number of Hip Replacements (both cemented and uncemented) undertaken 42 at each hospital for every year of the data. 43 44
The aggregated dataset at the hospital level, described above, is then used to examine the 1 differences in hospital activity across the two country settings and attributed to changes in 2 English financial reimbursement rates. 3 4 5 4. Methods 6 7
We use regression analysis based on the proportion of uncemented Hip Replacements to test 8 whether hospitals in the PbR environment had a higher uptake of these procedures, relative to 9 hospitals in Scotland as they did not face changes in financial incentive and did not have to 10 enforce the NICE clinical guidance. We use a difference-in-difference (DiD) approach, as 11 specified below: 12
In this, our preferred empirical specification, the dependent variable is the proportion of 13
uncemented We test our difference-in-difference model, by running a difference in trends estimator to 34 examine the different phases of policy identification. We adopt this differences-in-trends 35 specification to take account of the manner of hospital procurement in Hip Replacement, as 36
we expect individual hospitals to run down their stock and replace stock, in line with the 37 change in financial incentives after the introduction of the PbR, through procurement 38 changes. In other words, the policy impact we assume will roll-out over time and will not 39 necessarily be a distinct one-off change in activity. In addition, we expect that once the 40 financial incentive is removed ( procedures in England), and ̃2 is the break point in the spline again at 2009 when the 5 incentive is removed. We interact these variables with our country identifier (country: 6
England being the treatment country = 1; Scotland as control = 0). The variable T is a time 7 trend to capture any systematic changes in practice over time, and as with the other models 8
we include a further number of controls relating to hospital and patient characteristics and 9
year dummies. 10 11
Imposing restrictions = = 0 returns a standard difference-in-trends estimator. More 12 generally, and θ, are the coefficients of interest as they are the spline-based difference-in-13 trends estimators that captures the difference in the average uptake of uncemented Hip As a final test on our basic specification we run an additional specification that allows us to 27 make better use of the individual patient level data. In particular, we are interested in 28 controlling for any individual patient characteristics which may increase the likelihood of 29 receiving a cemented or uncemented Hip Replacement. All models are run with standard errors clustered at the hospital level and with random 42 effects. The hospitals, h, are split into the treatment (England) and control (Scotland) groups, 43 foregoing the ability to estimate hospital fixed effects, except of course in the two-stage 44 estimation procedure. While this allows us to exploit the weaker rank condition of the 1 random effects estimator, all specifications include three variables to control for the types of 2 hospitals in the sample. These include teaching hospitals in both Scotland and England, and 3
Foundation Trusts (FTs) hospitals in England, which have a degree of independent self-4 management power compared to normal NHS hospitals, and Independent Sector Treatment 5
Centres (ISTCs), essentially privately owned specialised treatments centres located only in 6
England. ISTCs were introduced from 2005 onwards, and many were specifically created to 7 provide Hip Replacement. FTs were first introduced in 2004, but each year more trusts 8 gained this status. The dummy variable reflects this, and is "turned-on" the year a Trust earns 9
Foundation status. 10 11
A number of further robustness checks are also run against these specifications. To ensure 12 that the trend in activity is similar across the two countries prior to the introduction of the 13 incentive; by running the same models on the sample from 1996-2003, the years before PbR 14 was introduced in England, using 2002 as the falsified 'policy-on' date. We also test the basic 15 specification excluding 'centres of excellence' (London, Glasgow and Edinburgh) in the two 16 countries, to control for instances where uncemented activity may reflect "innovative" 17 activity as opposed to motivation through financial incentive. Finally we also run two 18 specifications of the standard difference-in-difference estimator, separately for the emergency 19
and elective Hip Replacement activity to identify whether the effect is significant for each 20 group individually, given the difference in potential cost savings between them and the 21 presumed greater management flexibility in choice over prosthesis type when considering where the financial incentive was not introduced. The coefficient is robust to the exclusion of 1 control variables, as also seen in Table 3.  2  3 Finally, the last two columns of Table 3, present the results from OLS estimates difference-4 in-trends estimator using the linear splines specification. Our main coefficients of interest are 5 those on the interaction between the time trend variables (2005-2012 trend and 2009-2012 6 trend) and our country variable (coded with England=1). These are coefficients and , 7 which report the difference-in-trends estimate of the effect of the introduction of the PbR 8 reimbursement after 2005, and its removal in 2009, for uncemented Hip Replacement in 9
England. Coefficient is positive, and suggests that each hospital in England increased it's 10 up-take of uncemented hip prostheses by 5.1 per year compared to the period prior to the 11 introduction of PbR and in the control setting (Scotland) where the financial incentive was 12 not introduced. Coefficient is negative, and suggests that each hospital in England 13 decreased it's up-take of uncemented hip prostheses by 4.1 per year compared to the period 14 when the differential incentive was in place and in the control setting (Scotland). This implies 15 that across the 257 English hospitals in our sample in 2009, an additional 1,311 uncemented 16
Hip Replacements were performed as a result of the financial incentive that would not have 17 been performed otherwise. 18 19 Table 4 presents the results as estimated by equation (4), from the two-stage model. In this 20 specification the coefficient of interest is again appropriately signed and highly significant, 21 indicating a step-change difference in activity of around 10, suggesting that each hospital in 22
England increased it's up-take of uncemented hip prostheses by around 10 compared to the 23 period prior to the introduction of the incentive and relative to Scotland. This implies that 24 across the 257 English hospitals in our sample in 2009, an additional 2,570 uncemented Hip 25
Replacements were performed as a result of the financial incentive, controlling for patient 26 characteristics 12 . 27 28
Tables 5, 6 and 7 present the results from the additional robustness checks. We report the 29 trend tests in Table 5 , where we run the same model on the sample of years before the PbR 30 policy was introduced (1996-2003) with a proxy PbR introduction date (2002) . The results 31 indicate that the difference-in-trend and difference-in-difference estimates are no longer 32 significant when we use an earlier year (2002) for our break-point. We use 2003 as the prior 33 date here to avoid any confounding of the policy on date, as by 2004 the reimbursement tariff 34 structure for hip replacement was in place, although it was set at a common level across both 35 prosthesis types. 36 37 Table 6 , presents the results from the tests excluding the hospitals from the 'centres of 38 excellence', which are run to ensure that the increase in uncemented procedures is not 39 occurring only in certain geographical regions. The basic specification is tested on samples 40 excluding hospitals based in London, London and Glasgow and London, Glasgow and 41
Edinburgh. The result is robust to all these specifications, and remains significant at p<0.01. 42
The coefficient size slightly increases when the Scottish centres are excluded, as they are 43 largely accounting for the uncemented activity. 44 45 <Insert Table 4 here>  46  47 place -and the coefficient is stable in both size and magnitude.
<Insert Table 5 here>  1  2 <Insert Table 6 here>  3  4 Finally, Table 7 explicitly tests the basic specification using the proportions elective and 5 emergency uncemented activity to total activity, as well as the levels of elective and 6 emergency activity as dependent variables. The treatment effect remains significant for both 7 elective and emergency procedures, and as expected is of greater magnitude in the elective 8 specification which accounts for more of the Hip Replacement activity. In the levels models, 9
we include variables for the levels of the other forms of activity (cemented, emergency and 10 elective) to see if there is any substitution away from cemented to uncemented, and away 11 from elective to emergencywhere the financial incentive is stronger. While in both cases 12 the coefficient is negative on cemented activity, suggesting substitution from cemented to 13 uncemented prosthesis, it is only significant in the case of elective Hip Replacements. The 14 coefficient on the emergency and elective coefficients are positive, suggesting that cases are 15 increasing for both types of admission, and no substitution is occurring between them. 16 17 18
Conclusion 19 20
There is a general belief that financial incentives affect clinical and hospital behaviour. This is the first study to focus attention on highly substitutable procedures that are subject to 31 different reimbursement levels, to assess whether financial incentives affect clinical practice. 32
It has been commonly claimed as part of the managed care literature that clinical activity will 33
shift in response to a financial incentive, but there has little rigorous, empirical evidence to 34 uphold the claim. We have been able to employ a difference-in-difference approach to 35 analyse the effect within the UK NHS as, while England adopted different reimbursement 36 levels for uncemented and cemented Hip Replacements, over the same period Scotland did 37 not. Our results suggest that the English NHS experienced much higher, relative uptake rates 38 of the more generously reimbursed, and presumably more profitable uncemented Hip 39
Replacements than Scotland, once PbR had been introduced in England. This increase 40 ensued, despite the fact that clinical guidance recommending cemented Hip Replacements 41 had been produced by NICE, which is considered a benchmark for regulating English 42 hospital activity. The generosity of the reimbursement, with the presumed higher mark-up 43
given published reference costs for the procedure, coupled with a centralised procurement 44 activity appears however to have led hospitals to pursue a management policy which is at 45 odds with the national clinical guidance over the period of study. 46 47
This is an important finding. This conclusion is specific to this particular, perhaps unique 48 case but the finding does support the view, and provides much needed empirical evidence, 49 that financial incentives can trump clinical guidance. It may be that the management policies 50 that react to financial incentives are easier to pursue where hospitals practice centralised 1 procurement of course. We know that financial incentives guide clinical practice in other 2 areas (Gravelle et al. 2010) . What is of interest in this case study is the financial incentive 3 appears to lead to behaviour that contradicts national clinical guidance on hip prosthesis. It 4 could be that clinical pressure is not brought to bear in this particular case as the different 5 types of prosthesis appear to be highly substitutable and the clinical outcomes are similar 6 regardless of the prosthesis used. That said on the introduction of best practice traffic within 7
England, where no reimbursement difference is maintain across the prosthesis, data show a 8 marked trend towards cemented prosthesis and a slowing down in uncemented activity. 9
While other reforms are taking place around this time it is difficult to define a reform, other 10 than the change in financial incentive and the NICE clinical guidance, that impacts 11 differentially on use of specific prothesis type. However, we are not able to rigorously 12 analyse the effect after the removal of the incentive, as we have only two years worth of data 13 past 2010, but where we do control for this further change in financial incentive are results 14
hold. The findings for our study period are however clear, on the introduction of PbR in 15
England more generous reimbursement led to a greater volume of uncemented prosthesis use, 16 a prosthesis which is relatively more expensive than the close substitute and which was not 17 supported by clinical guidance. 
